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Introduction
This paper examines the culture of defensive medicine that 
has spread rapidly across the United States in response to an 
increase in malpractice lawsuits and staggering malpractice 
insurance premiums in certain high-risk medical and surgical 
specialties.  Due to the presence of this culture, it is important 
to question whether tort reform (e.g. placing caps on jury 
awards) is necessary to curb rising malpractice insurance 
premiums and reduce the implicit costs of defensive medicine. 
Based on compelling data, placing caps on jury awards for 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages will reduce malpractice 
premiums, ensure fair compensation for victims of medi-
cal negligence, and encourage physicians to practice sound 
medicine in high-risk specialties by dismantling the culture of 
defensive medicine prevalent throughout the United States. 
The culture of defensive medicine is defined by the Of-
fice of Technology Assessment as the practice of “order[ing] 
tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid[ing] high risk patients or 
procedures, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to reduce 
[doctors’] exposure to malpractice liability.”1  Indeed, as two 
prominent economists, Kessler and McClellan, argue, “Defen-
sive medicine is a potentially serious social problem: if fear of 
liability drives health care providers to administer treatments 
that do not have worthwhile medical benefits, then the current 
liability system may generate inefficiencies many times great-
er than the costs of compensating malpractice claimants.”2  
Even more troubling, Studdert et al. surveyed 824 physicians 
on the prevalence of defensive medicine in their practice: 93 
percent reported that they sometimes or often engaged in de-
fensive medicine outlined in the survey.3 Many of the respon-
dents to the survey also reported that they had restricted the 
scope of their clinical practice because of liability concerns 
(42 percent) and/or were likely to do so further in the next two 
years (49 percent).3  It is critical, therefore, for policymakers 
and future healthcare professionals to have a sound under-
standing of the defensive medicine culture (and the benefits of 
tort reform) to understand how it contributes, along with other 
factors, to current “expenditures [of U.S. healthcare which are 
predicted to rise] from $1.6 trillion in 2002 (14.9 percent of 
gross domestic product) to $3.6 trillion by 2013 (18.4 percent 
of gross domestic product).”4 
Basis for Soaring U.S. Healthcare Costs 
First, this paper will discuss how the defensive medicine 
culture has contributed in a small (yet significant) manner 
to the overwhelming cost of American health care today. 
Next, this essay will propose and support that a viable though 
contentious solution to this culture is tort reform. It will also 
consider opposing arguments that suggest defensive medicine 
is not a substantial problem, but instead that other problems 
(diminishing stock market returns, culture of technology, 
etc.) play a greater role in increasing malpractice premiums 
and healthcare costs. Then, it will explain why no sweeping, 
national tort reform measures exist in the United States. Fi-
nally, it will conclude by summarizing both sides’ arguments 
and discuss the broader implications of this debate for future 
policymakers to comprehensively attack the problem of rising 
healthcare costs in the United States.
 The culture of defensive medicine that has taken root in 
the United States in recent decades has led to escalating health 
care costs caused by an increase in medical procedures and 
tests designed to prevent high-cost malpractice lawsuits. This 
is accurately summarized by Kessler and McClellan, who 
state, “Many physicians and policymakers have argued that 
the incentive costs of the malpractice system, due to extra tests 
and procedures ordered in response to the perceived threat of 
a medical malpractice claim, may account for…the explo-
sive growth in healthcare costs.”2 Additionally, patient care 
outcomes may suffer as a result of “the practice of defensive 
medicine…if liability induces providers either to administer 
harmful treatments or forego risky but beneficial ones.” 
Clearly, the practice of ordering extra and unnecessary tests 
and procedures indirectly increases patients’ costs. Indeed, as 
Studdert et al. argue, “…the prevalence of assurance behavior, 
coupled with the unit of cost procedures typically ordered (e.g. 
MRIs), lends weight to arguments that the total cost of defen-
sive medicine is substantial.”3 As patients use a larger quantity 
of services, insurers must reimburse physicians for more; this 
drives up health insurance premiums as insurers must make 
a profit to stay in business. Since medical resources are finite 
(the supply) while the medical services requested increase 
exponentially (the demand), the cost of each service must 
increase accordingly. As such, higher insurance premiums 
combined with higher costs for individual services contribute 
to an overall increase in healthcare costs for the country. 
Implications for Patient Care 
Physicians have a greater incentive to take precautions 
with certain risky procedures and medically liable patients. 
However, it is an incentive which has long-term, negative con-
sequences. Regarding defensive medicine, state and national 
surveys have reported that 16 to 64 percent of physicians 
across all specialties stopped providing or limited the frequen-
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“ It is imperative for policymakers to examine [defensive medicine] as one of multiple contrib-
uting factors in the national dialogue on preserv-
ing the physician-patient relationship and protect-
ing the quality of patient care. ”
cy of providing certain high-risk procedures or they simply 
avoided certain patients because of the malpractice environ-
ment.5 As more providers run more precautionary exams and 
tests to avoid medical liability while limiting the frequency 
of the high-risk procedures which may improve the patient’s 
quality of life, more patients will suffer from chronic illnesses 
and may develop more serious problems due to lack of access. 
Studdert also supports the prevalence of the negative conse-
quences of defensive medicine by noting that large numbers of 
physicians reported engaging in avoidance behavior. Indeed, 
some surgeons appeared to limit their practice to “bread-and-
butter” cases, no longer performing difficult procedures, while 
avoiding sicker patients, those with prior 
complications, and those who had sued 
before.3 Jacobson and Rosenquist contest, 
however, that “the inability to control [the 
culture of technology]…is likely to put a 
far greater strain on the nation’s health care 
resources than is the practice of defensive 
medicine”, though they concede that “the existence and extent 
of defensive medicine comprise an important policy issue 
that needs to be addressed.”6  Additionally, U.S. government 
institutions such as the now-defunct Office of Technology As-
sessment concluded in 1994 that “[defensive medicine only] 
accounts for approximately 5 to 8 percent of all diagnostic 
tests.”7 Although the impact and extent of defensive medicine 
is disputed, most observers agree that it is imperative for poli-
cymakers to examine it as one of multiple contributing factors 
in the national dialogue on preserving the physician-patient 
relationship and protecting the quality of patient care.  
Indeed, there is evidence that the implicit, mutual trust 
of the physician-patient relationship is eroding as physi-
cians see patients as adversaries and potential plaintiffs.  In 
fact, “certain types of patients commonly prompt specialist 
physicians to behave defensively, especially those who are 
seen as demanding, emotional, or unpredictable…patients 
with prior complications…noncompliant patients, workers’ 
compensation cases, and obese persons…[This reflects] a 
level of suspicion that itself is arguably detrimental to quality 
[and leads to dissatisfaction among physicians].”3 If unhappy 
physicians cannot reciprocate the trust placed in them by their 
patients, they cannot provide quality care; likewise, if the 
patient cannot trust the physician, he is less likely to adhere to 
medical advice and more likely to have a poor outcome. Kai-
ser Permanente researcher Donald Freeborn agrees, stating, 
“Low levels of job satisfaction among physicians may affect 
doctor-patient relationships and compromise quality of care.”8  
Consequently, it is clear that the culture of defensive medicine 
in the U.S. has multiple negative consequences: higher health-
care costs through unnecessary tests and procedures, limited 
access to high-risk procedures or for high-risk patients, lower 
quality patient care/outcomes, and a more hostile, adversarial 
physician-patient relationship. 
Solution: Tort Reform?  
In response to these harmful consequences of defensive 
medicine, many groups (American Medical Association, 
American Tort Reform Association, and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce) have proposed tort reform through caps on jury 
awards to rein in the escalating costs of malpractice insurance 
and encourage physicians to practice sound medicine. Indeed, 
many physicians “maintain that escalating, multimillion-dollar 
awards are driving premium increases and that restricting 
malpractice payments will lower health care expenditures by 
reducing the practice of defensive medicine.”9  
To be clear, it is not merely speculation that malpractice 
insurance premiums are increasing for many physicians in 
high-risk specialties. According to Emory University public 
health expert Kenneth Thorpe, “Depending on the specialty 
and state, the median increase in malpractice premiums 
ranged from 15 to 30 percent. Rate increases in other states, 
such as Pennsylvania, ranged from 26 to 73 percent in 
2003.”10  Linking malpractice premiums to defensive medi-
cine, several studies have found evidence “supporting…that 
the scope and extent of defensive medicine is greater in areas 
with high malpractice claim rates and high premiums.” For 
additional evidence, the Hellinger study noted that “rates of 
growth in malpractice premiums and claims payments have 
been slower on average in states that enacted certain caps on 
damages for pain and suffering—referred to as non-economic 
damage caps—than in states with more limited reforms…
from 2001 through 2002, average premium rates rose approxi-
mately 10 [percent] in states with non-economic damage caps 
of $250,000 compared with approximately 29 [percent] in 
states with more limited tort reforms.”9 Therefore, setting caps 
on jury awards has a positive impact on reducing defensive 
medicine and malpractice premiums. 
The Thorpe article “The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’” 
supplies additional data to support the passage of caps on jury 
awards: “premiums in states with a cap on awards were 17.1 
percent lower than in states without such caps.”10 To further 
bolster this argument, the authors from Indiana University, 
Gronfein and Kinney, discuss the effects of tort reform in Indi-
ana of caps on both economic and non-economic damages. 
In 1975, Indiana adopted a comprehensive set of malpractice 
insurance and tort reforms, including a cap on all damages, a 
state-operated insurance fund for claims over $100,000 and 
mandated pre-trial medical review before trial. Compared with 
similar sized, neighboring states Michigan and Ohio, which 
do not have these reforms, Indiana has enjoyed one of the 
lowest rates of malpractice insurance in the United States. In 
fact, Gronfein and Kinney go on to argue that “under Indi-
ana’s system, all major parties are better off in the aggregate. 
Malpractice insurers…[are better off because] claim severity 
is controlled and therefore more predictable. Providers are 
better off because they are assured the availability of cover-
age and comparatively low malpractice insurance costs. Most 
importantly, most claimants with large claims are better off 
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because they receive more (30 to 40 percent higher than in 
Michigan or Ohio) for their injuries and their attorneys’ fees 
are capped.”11               
However, there is an important tradeoff to consider with 
the reduced compensation of elderly and unemployed plain-
tiffs under a tort system capped for non-economic damages. 
As Hyman et al. report in the case of Texas, “Payouts…varied 
across groups; for example aggregate (per claim mean) pay-
outs declined by 38% (19%) for elderly plaintiffs, compared 
to 22% (10%) for babies…there is a striking gap [as well] 
between the 53% aggregate reduction payout for unemployed 
deceased plaintiffs, versus 17% decline for employed de-
ceased plaintiffs.”12  Tort reform through caps on jury awards 
clearly decreases malpractice premium rates and helps reduce 
defensive medicine, but proponents must carefully design and 
implement plans to minimize disparities in fair compensation 
for victims of medical negligence based on age, employment 
status, or other factors.
Criticism of Tort Reform 
As seen in parts of this article, opponents of tort reform 
argue that defensive medicine is not the problem (or only 
contributes negligibly to total health care costs), but rather 
that insurance companies’ declining stock market returns are 
to blame for the current medical liability crisis. They argue 
that tort reform through caps on jury awards reduces fair 
compensation to injured plaintiffs, allows physicians to escape 
punishment, makes no guarantee that insurance companies 
will reduce malpractice premiums, and results in unsafe medi-
cal practices. They contend that defensive medicine is not a 
substantial problem contributing to the rising costs of health-
care in the United States.  
 First, according to many of the studies cited in this paper, 
both defensive medicine and insurance company losses play a 
role in the current malpractice crisis. While Thorpe states that 
“higher investment returns offset the need to raise premiums”, 
indicating that insurance company losses in the stock market 
may contribute to rising premiums, Jacobson et al. admit that 
“liability fears have no doubt influenced the climate of medi-
cal practice…[though] isolating the use of specific tests or 
procedures to avoid liability remains a difficult task.” Second, 
tort reform actually increases fair compensation for injured 
plaintiffs. For instance, Indiana actually pays out “nearly 40 
percent [more]…than the mean claim payment in Michigan 
[and] 33 percent [more] than the mean claim payment in 
Ohio.” Under their reformed civil law system, Indiana physi-
cians are assured “availability of [malpractice] coverage and 
comparatively low malpractice insurance costs.” Third, vic-
tims of real medical negligence, as determined by a pre-trial 
medical review board, can still sue physicians for generous 
awards commensurate with their injuries. Fourth, as the tort 
reform in Indiana shows, malpractice premiums dropped 
relative to the rates in the rest of the country as “claim sever-
ity [was] more controlled and predictable.” Last, with lower 
malpractice premiums, physicians would be encouraged to 
treat high-risk patients and perform high-risk procedures more 
often; the financial and emotional costs of defensive medicine 
would decrease as doctors limited tests and procedures to only 
those that were necessary.8
Current Obstacles
Despite the benefits of tort reform and legislation to place 
caps on jury awards in 28 states, no federal legislation has 
passed to provide sweeping damage caps in the entire nation 
due to the efforts of various lobbying forces. According to 
a 2001 article by Scott Tarry, the American Association of 
Justice (AAJ) lobby, formerly known as the Association of 
Trial Lawyers of America, is “one of the nation’s most well-
connected and biggest spending interest groups.”13  In fact, the 
Center for Responsive Politics reported recently that the AAJ 
lobby contributed over $1.4 million to various political cam-
paigns in the 2008 election cycle. In comparison, the Ameri-
can Medical Association lobby has spent a meager $300,000 
in campaign contributions thus far.14 
Unfortunately, politicians respond to campaign contribu-
tions through the legislation they push through Congress, 
which often serves the interests of their richest supporters. As 
such, the AAJ and others lobby aggressively to block legisla-
tion that would threaten hefty fees in malpractice lawsuits 
(i.e. tort reform through caps on jury awards). Ironically, 
as mentioned above, plaintiffs would actually obtain larger 
jury awards (“40 percent more than in Michigan, 33 percent 
more than in Ohio”) with tort reform as seen in Indiana. Trial 
lawyers would still draw generous fees from their clients’ law-
suits, but perhaps not the exorbitant sums they often receive. 
“During 1990, 1.5 percent of all paid claims exceeded a mil-
lion dollars. By 2001 the percentage had risen to 8 percent,” 
cites Thorpe, underscoring the rising rate of large jury awards. 
Additionally, even though juries award large sums to plain-
tiffs, much of it is swallowed up by “standard contingency 
fees charged by plaintiffs’ attorneys (35 percent of the indem-
nity payment),”15  which affirms Studdert’s prior convictions. 
As such, as long as there are lobbyists in Washington, it is 
clear that legislation will favor the most generous lobbyists; to 
combat this problem and push tort reform through, like-mind-
ed organizations must band together to spend more money 
explaining its merits to key members of Congress who can 
then effect change to pass bipartisan, nuanced legislation with 
the cooperation of opposing parties. 
Conclusion
The culture of defensive medicine that has taken root 
across the United States calls for greater discussion of change 
in the tort law system among all parties involved (physicians, 
insurers, lawyers, patients). The presented data from a wide 
variety of studies and reports suggest that setting caps on jury 
awards through tort reform will appreciably decrease mal-
practice premiums, encourage physicians to practice sound 
medicine, and decrease the number of malpractice lawsuits 
through the elimination of the pervasive defensive medicine 
culture. Indeed, as Kessler and McClellan conclude in their 
study, “We find that malpractice reforms that directly reduce 
provider liability pressure lead to reductions of 5 to 9 percent 
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in medical expenditures without substantial effects on mortal-
ity or medical complications…liability reforms can reduce 
defensive medical practices.”2 Keeping in mind the Hyman 
et al. article, wise reformers will take a nuanced approach to 
tort reform, particularly with setting caps on jury awards, to 
ensure fair, equitable compensation for all plaintiffs regardless 
of age, employment status, or other variable12. 
Nevertheless, the passage of meaningful tort reform similar 
to that of Indiana will require a significant majority of sup-
porters, especially among those who staunchly oppose any 
caps on jury awards. While tort reform opponents make their 
case articulately against caps on jury awards, which they 
claim would protect physicians and insurers over patients, the 
data for the benefits of tort reform is more compelling. In par-
ticular, explaining the current, stabilized malpractice situation 
in Indiana (an example of effective tort reform) to the AAJ 
is a wise move in building a task force across aisles to best 
serve the economic interests of lawyers, physicians, insurers, 
and the economic interests of and quality of care for patients. 
Future policy makers and politicians interested in progress on 
this clearly divisive issue should focus on generating healthy 
debate on the various factors contributing to the costliness of 
American healthcare (defensive medicine, diminishing stock 
market returns, culture of technology) and negotiating com-
prehensive, bipartisan legislation “[chiefly] to promote patient 
safety [and] not merely to provide safe harbors for potential 
defendants.”5
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